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Abstract
This paper presents two examples taken from industrial case-studies that have been
speciﬁed using an event system approach. Component speciﬁcations, taking the
form of pre-post formula, have been derived. Constraints which ensure the correct-
ness of the whole process are given.
1 Introduction
Our purpose is to present a methodological process which can be used for an
entire system development. We deﬁne a system according to the properties
it must satisfy and express them in a formal way. This process leads us to
build two sorts of mathematical models: event models and operational models.
They deﬁne the formal speciﬁcation of the entire system. These models are
proved to be consistent and the correctness of the whole process is ensured, i.e.
the correctness of the implementation of each component and the correctness
of the implementation of the entire system.
The applications we have in mind heavily interact with their environment.
They may use existing hardware and software components.
Addressed issues: A ﬁrst issue is the big quantity of information required
by this kind of speciﬁcation, which makes necessary to introduce a certain
hierarchy into the expressed ideas. This is done in two ways: by deﬁning the
more abstract aspects and gradually focusing upon details; and by grouping
properties into speciﬁc categories (properties which describe the interactions
between components and with the environment, and properties which are local
to one component, like functional properties). We use reﬁnement techniques
[Back 88], [Morg 90], [Abr 96-1], [But 96] to support the abstraction i.e. to
introduce details and to express some design decisions.
A second issue is how to specify interactions of a system with its environ-
c©2002 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
84
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Lopez, Simonot, Viguie
ment. The trend is to build a closed model [Abr 96-2] which includes the
whole environment. However, this model can be extremely complex. In our
approach, we develop a closed model which speciﬁes only the interactions
of the system with the environment. Furthermore, reﬁning a closed system
might lead to a program failing to implement the speciﬁcation we have in
mind [Lop,Sim,Don 00].
Choices: The formal speciﬁcation language must allow the expression of
nondeterministic speciﬁcations and has to be supported by eﬃcient proof as-
sistants, So we neither combine diﬀerent logic nor introduce new ones. We
largely rely on existing proven methods backed by tools. We adopt the set
theory as well as the reﬁnement techniques as they are encapsulated in the
actual tools [Atelier B], [B Toolkit].
Process: We start from an informal speciﬁcation written in a natural lan-
guage which describes all the properties the system must satisfy. Domain
experts participate in the elaboration and validation of this document. When
system details are introduced, some implementation choices can be made: for
example re-using existing devices with well-deﬁned interfaces.
Then we build, step by step, an event model which only describes the inter-
actions of the system with its environment and between the diﬀerent com-
ponents. It expresses the hypothesis that we make on the environment. We
only keep from the initial properties those that express interactions. This pro-
cess is controlled by event reﬁnement techniques as deﬁned in [Lam,Sha 90],
[But 96], [Abr 96-2], [Back,Kur 88].
After this, the event model is transformed into a shared module which is
used in the speciﬁcation of components. This module provides the external
and internal communications mechanisms of the system. It is called interface
module. Roughly speaking, by module we mean a set of program speciﬁcations
which can be reﬁned to sequential program implementations.
Finally, the speciﬁcation of each component is written separately. It in-
corporates the properties of the informal speciﬁcation related to only to this
component, and which therefore, have not yet been taken into account. Com-
ponent speciﬁcations are used as the starting point for the usual reﬁnement
process for sequential programs [Back 88], [Abr 96-1].
The correctness of the whole process is presented in [Lop 02]. In this ar-
ticle, the conditions that ensure this correctness will only lightly be touched
upon.
In the rest of this paper, we treat two examples extracted from industrial
case-studies which are speciﬁed and partially proven using [Atelier B]. They
are presented in the syntax of this tool and some comments are added to help
the reader. However, the B method does not include two important notions
we use: shared modules and auxiliary variables. These notions are introduced
and formally deﬁned in [Lop 02]. They tend to extend the utilization of the
B method to concurrent systems and distributed systems. The ﬁrst example
illustrates the way we use to specify a large system. The second example
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illustrates the way we use to derive component speciﬁcations. The event spec-
iﬁcation of this example is detailed in [Lop,Sim,Don 00].
2 An event based speciﬁcation: The passenger exchange
function of the Me´te´or Metro Line
Meteor is a new and totally automated metro line built in Paris. The line
is formed by trains and arrival/departure platforms. Trains and platforms
have doors. The passenger exchange function 1 must ensure the passengers’
safety, which is built upon four independent principles that can be expressed
as follows:
P0 An exchange cannot generate an unsafe situation.
P1 To guarantee the passengers’ safety, it is necessary to ensure the immobility
of the train during the exchange.
P2 Passengers are safe if the trains and the platforms are closed universes.
P3 If a dangerous situation occurs, the passengers should have the possibility
of leaving the train at any time to get a safe environment.
Several kinds of passenger exchanges can be identiﬁed: the usual ones, and
emergency evacuations which happen when a dangerous situation is detected.
Such an evacuation has to be launched as soon as a danger occurs 2 .
2.1 Recalls
Events. An event speciﬁcation takes the form ∃a. G(x, a) ∧ A(x, a, x′). The
guard constraints the occurrence of the event and the action speciﬁes its ef-
fect. The variable a allows to express the external non-determinism, i.e.,
external values provided by the environment. The guard G(x, a) deﬁnes the
states in which the event can be observed, the action A(x, a, x′) relates sys-
tem states before and after the observation. The concrete syntax of an event
(in [Abr 96-2]) is any a where G(x, a) then Sx,a where Sx,a is the generalized
substitution which is a translation of A(x, a, x′). For instance x′ = x ∪ a is
translated into x := x ∪ a.
Event Reﬁnement. Let E1(x, x
′) be of the form ∃a. G1(x, a) ∧ A1(x, a, x′)
and E2(w,w
′) be of the form ∃a. G2(w, a) ∧A2(w, a, w′), the speciﬁcations of
two events. They are deﬁned on two diﬀerent state spaces. Let J(x,w) be a
total relation deﬁned between these two spaces, the formula E1 JE2 =def
∀x,w,w′. ∃a. (J(x,w)∧G2(w, a)∧A2(w, a, w′))⇒ ∃a, x′. G1(x, a)∧A1(x, a, x′)∧
J(x′, w′) expresses the fact that all state changes observed with E2 are also
observed with E1.
1 This case-study has been proposed by the RATP and Matra Transport International
within the framework of an agreement between the CNAM computer research center (lab.
CEDRIC), RATP, MTI(SIEMENS), and STERIA under the contract DJ.0246/98.
2 This presentation is a simpliﬁed version of this problem -a more detailed description is
provided in [Lop 02], [Lop 99].
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Event System. An event system Ss = (x, IS, C,Ei) is formed by a shared
variable x that represents the system state, an invariant IS that expresses
static properties of the system, the speciﬁcation C that initializes the system
and the set of events Ei for i ∈ 1..n that deﬁnes the dynamics. Such systems
are transition systems, whose initial states are deﬁned by the initialization,
and whose transitions are deﬁned by the events.
System Consistency. An event system is said to be consistent if the invari-
ant is established by the initialization and preserved by each event.
System Reﬁnement. Let S1 and S2 be two event systems, let J(x,w) be a
total relation between their variables, S1 is reﬁned by S2 (S1 J S2 ) if each
event of S2 is a reﬁnement of the corresponding event of S1, and if the ini-
tialization of S2 is a reﬁnement of the initialization of S1. The corresponding
proof obligations are generated by the actual tools.
Adding new events. According to [Abr 96-2], [Lop 02], it is possible during
a reﬁnement:
• to add new events. For this, we have just to assume that the new event is
present in the abstract system with true ∧ skip as its speciﬁcation. skip
means that the new event does not modify any variable of the abstract
system. This means that when a new variable is introduced, the reﬁnement
must include all the events which modify this variable. This constrains the
way events are introduced.
• to split an event. This decomposition allows us to observe an event with
greater precision. In order to do this, it suﬃces to assume that in the
abstract system, the abstract event E is duplicated as many times as needed
and that each event in the decomposition must be a reﬁnement of E.
2.2 First model
This model introduces the main notions of the system: trains tt, platforms qq,
and their possible states (variables): unsafe (td, qd) or safe (tt− td, qq − qd).
At this level, only the property P0 can be expressed. We can observe ﬁve
events:
- UnsafeTrain, SafeTrain which modify the variable td.
- UnsafePlatf, SafePlatf which modify the variable qd.
- Transfer which has no eﬀect upon the environment and can be activated
at any time.
Note that Transfer can occur at any time and not only in a safe situation.
Note also that the property P0 is expressed by the fact that the action of
Transfer does not modify the system state.
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SYSTEM Meteor1.1
SETS tt; qq /* Trains, platforms of the line */
VARIABLES td, qd /* Unsafe trains and platforms */
INVARIANT td ⊆ tt ∧ qd ⊆ qq
INITIALISATION td, qd := ∅, ∅ /* The line is safe */
EVENTS
Transfer =ˆ
SELECT TRUE /* An exchange is always observable. */
THEN SKIP /* The safety is not modiﬁed (P0). */
END;
UnsafeTrain =ˆ /* A safe train becomes unsafe */ UnsafePlatf =ˆ /* q1 becomes unsafe */
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ tt ∧ t1 /∈ td ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qq ∧ q1 /∈ qd
THEN td := td ∪ {t1} THEN qd := qd ∪ {q1}
END; END;
SafeTrain =ˆ /* An unsafe train becomes safe */ SafePlatf =ˆ /* q1 becomes safe */
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ td ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qd
THEN td := td− {t1} THEN qd := qd− {q1}
END; END
The proofs of consistency of this model are generated and discharged by
the Atelier B. We can prove additional properties using this model. For ex-
ample, deadlock freeness is implied by the fact that under the invariant, the
disjunction of the guards is always true. We can also prove properties of event
traces the system should allow: for instance, Transfer can be observed at any
time.
2.3 Second model
This model introduces the notion of locked train needed to express property
P1. A locked train is totally stopped and to start moving, some actions need
to be executed before.
The variable ti models the set of locked trains. Hence, two new events
LockedTrain and UnlockedTrain are introduced.
At this level, we want to observe separately two kinds of exchanges :
normal exchanges and other cases. To diﬀerentiate these two cases, we dis-
tinguish those trains which are doing a passenger exchange in normal condi-
tions: variable ttv. This partition is done by decomposing the event Transfer
of the previous model into two events EndPassExch (normal exchange) and
Transfer1 (other exchanges). An event, StartPassExch, must be added to
modify ttv. It allows to observe the beginning of a normal passenger exchange.
A normal exchange is done when a train is in ttr. Hence, ttv only in-
cludes trains which satisfy this property. To express this, we introduce a
partial function t q from trains to platforms, the variable qtv denotes the
set of trains which are doing a passenger exchange in the normal conditions.
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StartPassExch is activated if the train is stopped in front of a platform, and
hence, t q appears in its guard. Other events that modify this variable are
introduced: DepartureFromPlatf and ArrivalToPlatf.
Property P1 is an invariant of the system. The ﬁrst four events of the
system Meteor1.1 are included here in addition to the events that we have
just introduced. The ﬁrst four events are still not synchronized. The new
events are synchronized as follows:
LockedTrain → Transfer1 → UnlockedTrain
ArrivalToPlatf → LockedTrain → StartPassExch → EndPassExch →
UnlockedTrain → DepartureFromPlatf.
LockedTrain → UnlockedTrain
The guarantee of this synchronization is obtained by proof obligations in-
volving only guards.
SYSTEM Meteor1.2
VARIABLES
td, qd, /* Unsafe trains and platforms */
t q, /* Trains in front of platforms */
ttr, /* Trains doing an exchange */
ttv, qtv, /* Trains and platforms doing a passenger exchange */
ti /* Locked trains */
INVARIANT
td ⊆ tt ∧ qd ⊆ qq ∧
t q ∈ tt qq ∧ ttv ⊆ ttr ⊆ ti ⊆ tt ∧ /* includes (P1) */
ttv ∈ dom(t q) ∧ qtv = t q[ttv] ∧
INITIALISATION t q, ttr, ttv, td, ti, qtv, qd := ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅
EVENTS
UnsafeTrain =ˆ . . . UnsafePlatf =ˆ . . .
SafeTrain =ˆ . . . SafePlatf =ˆ . . .
StartPassExch =ˆ /* t1 starts a Transfer */ EndPassExch =ˆ /* t1 ﬁnishes a Transfer */
ANY t1 WHERE ANY t1 WHERE
t1 ∈ ti ∧ t1 /∈ ttr∧ t1 ∈ ttv
t1 ∈ dom(t q) ∧ t q(t1) /∈ qtv /* t1 is in Transfer */
THEN ttv, qtv, ttr := ttv ∪ {t1}, THEN ttv, qtv, ttr := ttv − {t1},
qtv ∪ t q[t1], ttr ∪ {t1} qtv − t q[t1], ttr − {t1}
END; END;
Transfer1 =ˆ
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ ti ∧ t1 /∈ ttv /* t1 is not in Transfer */
THEN SKIP /* end of the Transfer */
END;
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LockedTrain =ˆ UnlockedTrain =ˆ
/* An unlocked train becomes locked */ /* A locked train becomes unlocked */
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ tt ∧ t1 /∈ ti ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ ti ∧ t1 /∈ ttr
THEN ti := ti ∪ {t1} THEN ti := ti− {t1}
END; END;
ArrivalToPlatf =ˆ DepartureFromPlatf =ˆ
/* A train arrives to a (free) platform */ /* A train is leaving a platform */
ANY t1, q1 WHERE t1 ∈ tt∧ ANY t1 WHERE
q1 ∈ qq ∧ t1 /∈ dom(t q)∧ t1 ∈ dom(t q)∧
q1 /∈ ran(t q) ∧ t1 /∈ ti t1 /∈ ti
THEN t q := t q ∪ {t1 → q1} THEN t q := {t1}  t q
END; END;
2.4 Third model
In this model, we observe the normal openings of the doors. It introduces the
safety property P2 which can be rewritten as follows: (P2.1) a train which
is not closed is in a passenger exchange state, (P2.2) a platform which is
not closed is a platform on which a passenger exchange is currently taking
place or which is in a safe state. We introduce open trains to and open plat-
forms qo as well as four events OpenedTrain, ClosedTrain, OpenedPlatf,
ClosedPlatf, which modify these variables. These events detail the tran-
sition StartPassExch → EndPassExch. Their guards deﬁne the following
synchronization:
OpenedTrain ClosedTrain
StartPassExch → → → EndPassExch
OpenedPlatf ClosedPlatf
The doors of a platform are opened only if the platform is safe. Here, we
introduce the variable qs and, therefore, two events SafeZone and UnsafeZone
which allow to modify this variable. These events detail the opening process
of a platform. SafeZone must occur before OpenPlatf and UnsafeZone before
ClosedPlatf.
SYSTEM Meteor1.3
VARIABLES
td, qd, t q, ttr, ttv, qtv, ti,
to, qo, /* Opened trains and platforms */
qs, /* safe platform zones */
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INVARIANT
td ⊆ tt ∧ qd ⊆ qq ∧ t q ∈ tt qq ∧
ttv ⊆ ttr ⊆ ti ⊆ tt ∧ /* includes (P1) */ ttv ∈ dom(t q) ∧ qtv = t q[ttv] ∧
to ⊆ ttr ⊆ tt ∧ /* includes (P2.1) */ qo ⊆ qq ∧
qs ⊆ qq ∧ qo ⊆ qtv ∪ qs /* (P 2.2) */
INITIALISATION t q, to, ttr, ttv, td, ti, qo, qtv, qd, qs := ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅
EVENTS
UnsafeTrain =ˆ . . . UnsafePlatf =ˆ . . .
SafeTrain =ˆ . . . SafePlatf =ˆ . . .
StartPassExch =ˆ . . . EndPassExch =ˆ
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ ttv ∧
t1 /∈ to ∧ t q(t1) /∈ qo
Transfer1 =ˆ . . . THEN ttv, qtv, ttr := ttv − {t1},
qtv − t q[t1], ttr − {t1} /* End of the transfer */
END;
LockedTrain =ˆ . . . UnlockedTrain =ˆ . . .
ArrivalToPlatf =ˆ . . . DepartureFromPlatf =ˆ . . .
OpenedTrain =ˆ /* t1 becomes opened */ ClosedTrain =ˆ /* t1 becomes closed */
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ ttr ∧ t1 /∈ to ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ to
THEN to := to ∪ {t1} THEN to := to− {t1}
END; END;
OpenedPlatf =ˆ /* q1 becomes opened */ ClosedPlatf =ˆ /* q1 becomes closed */
ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qtv ∪ qs ∧ q1 /∈ qo ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qo
THEN qo := qo ∪ {q1} THEN qo := qo− {q1}
END; END;
SafeZone =ˆ /* q1 zone becomes safe */ UnsafeZone =ˆ /* q1 zone becomes unsafe */
ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qq ∧ q1 /∈ qs ANY q1 WHERE q1 ∈ qs
THEN qs := qs ∪ {q1} THEN qs := qs− {q1}
END; END;
2.5 Fourth model
In this model, we introduce the property P3 and we observe an emergency
evacuation. In this case, passengers have to leave the train, so the train state
must allow the opening of the doors, and an access to a safe circulation zone
must also be provided. All of the trains which are in an emergency evacuation
are modeled by the variable teu. We have two events which allow us to observe
the beginning and the end of an emergency evacuation: StartEva and EndEva.
New notions: the evacuation zones ze, and among them, the subset of evac-
uation zones which are safe zs. We must be able to locate a train with respect
to the evacuation zones; this is the role of the function t z. The events which
modify t z (ArrivingZoneEva and LeavingZoneEva) and zs, (SafeZoneEva
and UnsafeZoneEva) are introduced. The localization of platforms into the
evacuation zones is deﬁned by the relation q z.
As previously, the event Transfer1 is decomposed into two events : EndEva
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and Transfer2. EndEvamodels the end of an emergency evacuation, the event
StartEva puts the train in a state of evacuation ( teu is modiﬁed).
And just like the previous systems, guards ensure the expected synchro-
nization.
SYSTEM Meteor1.4
SETS ze /* Evacuation zones */
CONSTANTS q z /* Localization of platforms into zones */
PROPERTIES q z ∈ qq↔ ze
VARIABLES
td, qd, t q, ttr, ttv, qtv ti,t0, q0, qs,
t z /* Localization of trains */ teu, zs /* Urgent evacuations and evacuation zones */
INVARIANT
td ⊆ tt ∧ qd ⊆ qq ∧ t q ∈ tt qq ∧ ttv ⊆ ttr ⊆ ti ⊆ tt ∧ /* includes (P 1) */
ttv ∈ dom(t q) ∧ qtv = t q[ttv] ∧ to ⊆ ttr ⊆ tt ∧ /* includes (P 2.1) */
qo ⊆ qq ∧ qs ⊆ qq ∧
qo ⊆ qtv ∪ qs /* (P2.2) */ t z ∈ tt↔ ze ∧ dom(t z) = tt ∧
t q−1; t z ⊆ q z teu ⊆ ttr ∧
ttv ∩ teu = ∅ ∧ teu ⊆ td ∧
zs ⊆ ze ∧ teu ⊆ t z−1[zs] /* (P 3.1) */
ran(q z) = ze /* (P 3.2) */
INITIALISATION t q, t z, to, ttr, ttv, teu, td, ti, qo, qtv, qd, qs, zs :
t q = ∅ ∧ t z ∈ tt↔ ze ∧ dom(t z) = tt ∧ to = ∅ ∧ ttr = ∅ ∧ ttv = ∅ ∧ teu = ∅ ∧ td = ∅ ∧
ti = ∅ ∧ qo = ∅ ∧ qtv = ∅ ∧ qd = ∅ ∧ qs = ∅ ∧ zs = ∅
EVENTS
UnsafeTrain =ˆ . . . UnsafePlatf =ˆ . . . SafeTrain =ˆ . . . SafePlatf =ˆ . . .
StartPassExch =ˆ . . . EndPassExch =ˆ . . . LockedTrain =ˆ . . . UnlockedTrain =ˆ . . .
ArrivalToPlatf =ˆ . . . DepartureFromPlatf =ˆ . . . OpenedTrain =ˆ . . . ClosedTrain =ˆ . . .
OpenedPlatf =ˆ . . . ClosedPlatf =ˆ . . . SafeZone =ˆ . . . UnsafeZone =ˆ . . .
StartEva =ˆ /* t1 starts an evacuation */ EndEva =ˆ /* an evacuation is ﬁnished */
ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ ti ∧ t1 ∈ td ∧ ANY t1 WHERE t1 ∈ teu ∧
t1 /∈ ttr ∧ t z[t1] ⊆ zs t1 /∈ to ∧ t1 /∈ td
THEN teu, ttr := teu ∪ {t1}, ttr ∪ {t1} THEN teu, ttr := teu− {t1}, ttr − {t1}
END; END;
Transfer2 =ˆ
ANY t1 WHERE t1 /∈ ttv ∪ teu ∧ t1 ∈ ti /* t1 is not in transfer */
THEN SKIP /* The transfer is ﬁnished */ END;
ArrivingZoneEva =ˆ /* t1 arrives in a zone */ LeavingZoneEva =ˆ /* t1 leaves z1 */
ANY t1, z1 WHERE t1 ∈ tt ∧ ANY t1, z1 WHERE t1 ∈ tt ∧
t1 /∈ ti ∧ z1 /∈ t z[t1] ∧ z1 ∈ ze ∧ z1 /∈ zs t1 /∈ ti ∧ z1 ∈ t z[t1] ∧ z1 /∈ zs
THEN t z := t z ∪ {t1 → z1} END; THEN t z := t z − {t1 → z1} END;
SafeZoneEva =ˆ /* z1 becomes safe */ UnsafeZoneEva =ˆ /* z1 becomes unsafe */
ANY z1 WHERE z1 ∈ ze ∧ z1 /∈ zs ANY z1 WHERE z1 ∈ zs ∧ z1 /∈ t z[td]
THEN zs := zs ∪ {z1} END; THEN zs := zs− {z1} END;
The other kind of passenger exchanges are introduced using a similar pro-
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cess.
2.6 Conclusion
What we obtain at this point is a formal description of the required behavior
of the system. It takes the form of an event model.
This model describes an automaton representing the external behavior.
Some safety properties specify the static of the system, the others specify the
dynamic. Here, P1, P2 and P3 are static, P0 is dynamic. Static properties are
embedded in the invariant. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation has a lot of events which
have been gradually introduced, thanks to the event reﬁnement mechanism.
This top down analysis leads us to introduce system details, though the order
of insertion between properties which have a similar abstraction level is more
or less arbitrary. For instance, the introduction of emergency evacuations
could be done before or at the same time as normal exchanges. Furthermore,
the reﬁnement process allows us to split the proofs of consistency of the ﬁnal
event system. Event Synchronization is distributed through the guards.
This application has been developed under AtelierB. Almost all the gen-
erated proof obligations have been automatically discharged.
However, we do not yet have the internal architecture of the system. The
isolation of each component has not yet been done and, moreover, for each
component, we do not have an implementation. In order to illustrate the
whole process, we will present a second application which has been taken to
the point of implementation.
3 Flight Warning System (FWS): The event model
3.1 Introduction
This case-study - the ﬂight warning system (FWS) used in the airbus A340
aircraft- was proposed by the Aerospatiale Company. FWS’s role is to mon-
itor aeroplane subsystems. When an abnormal situation appears, FWS must
decide on when, and how, to emit warning signals. One of the diﬃculties of
this study comes from an imposed constraint on the ﬁnal architecture: the
system must be formed by two cyclic concurrent processes. The ﬁrst one, P1,
deals with examining all the alarms. If an alarm is detected “present”, this
process conﬁrms it after a pre-deﬁned period of time. If an alarm is detected
’absent’, it removes it from the set of conﬁrmed alarms. The second process,
P2, has also to examine all the alarms. It is charged with emitting signals
associated to the alarms which have been conﬁrmed by the ﬁrst process.
Since the two cycles are concurrent it is not possible to specify the applica-
tion as being the following sequence: P1 ; P2. We have to allow for the fact
that an alarm is examined by P2 before P1, therefore, in this case, no signal
will be emitted. Let us imagine one alarm a being activated at a time t. Six
cases are possible:
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(i) t ...P1 ...P2: the alarm a ’happens’ before its examination by P1 and
P2. The alarm is treated by P1 during its running cycle and is treated by
P2. A signal is emitted 3 .
(ii) t ...P2 ...P1: the alarm a happens before its examination by P1 and
P2. The alarm is treated by P2. As a has not yet been examined by P1,
no signal is emitted during the running cycle of P2. A signal for a will
be emitted during the next cycle of P2 except if P1, during its own next
cycle, examines a before P2 and detects that a is absent.
(iii) P1 ...P2 ...t or P2 ...P1 ...t: a will be treated by the two processes
during their next cycles.
(iv) P1 ...t ...P2: same as situation 3.
(v) P2 ...t ...P1: during its running cycle, P1 examines and conﬁrms a.
P2 will treat a during its next cycle (unless P1 detects absence of a).
3.2 The Event model
Here, we present a simpliﬁed version of the case study which does not cover
details concerning the ﬂying phases and the signal composition. A complete
description is given in [Lop 96-1], [Lop 96-2].
The role of the event speciﬁcation is to model the interactions between
components and the environment. To do so, we need the set of alarms WW
and the set of signals Ss, and the following variables:
wp: set of emitted alarms,
se: set of emitted signals,
wc: set of conﬁrmed alarms,
We1, Wp1: alarms examined and detected present by P1
We2, Wc2 alarms examined and detected conﬁrmed by P2.
Num1: counter. Number of executed cycles of P1.
Num2: counter. Number of executed cycles of P2.
With this model, we observe the following:
the beginning of presence (NewWarning) and the end of presence (EndWarning)
of a warning situation (interaction with the environment),
the beginning of the emission (EmittedSignal) and the end (EndSignal) of
a signal (interaction between P2 and the environment),
the conﬁrmation (ConfirmWarning1) and its end (AbsentWarning1) of an
alarm (interaction between P1 and P2),
the examination (ExamineWarning1) of an alarm by P1 (interaction between
P1 and the environment),
the examination (ExamineWarning2) of an alarm by P2 (interaction between
P2 and the environment),
3 In the real system the signal can be emitted but there is no guarantee of this as the
aeroplane can be in a state where many alarms are activated, so there is a competition
[Lop 96-1].
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the beginning of a new cycle of P1 (BeginCycle1),
the beginning of a new cycle of P2 (BeginCycle2).
This event model is built as explained in the previous section.
SYSTEM FWS2
SETS Ww, Ss
VARIABLES wp, se, wc,Num1,Wp1,We1, Wc2,We2, Num2
INVARIANT wp,wc,Wp1,We1,Wc2,We2 ⊆ Ww ∧ se ⊆ Ss ∧Num1, Num2 ∈ NAT
INITIALIZATION wp, se, wc, Num1, Wp1, We1 Wc2, We2,Num2 : (wp = ∅ ∧ se = ∅ ∧ wc = ∅ ∧Num1 = 0
∧Wp1 = ∅ ∧We1 = ∅ ∧Wc2 = ∅ ∧We2 = Ww ∧Num2 = 0)
EVENTS
NewWarning =ˆ /* A new alarm is pre´sent */ EndWarning =ˆ /* End of an alarm */
ANY wx WHERE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ wp ANY wx WHERE wx ∈ wp
THEN wp := wp ∪ {wx} END; THEN wp := wp− {wx} END;
EmittedSignal =ˆ /* A new signal is emitted */ EndSignal =ˆ /* Extinction of a Signal */
ANY sx WHERE sx ∈ Ss ∧ sx /∈ se ANY sx WHERE sx ∈ se
THEN se := se ∪ {sx} END; THEN se := se− {sx} END;
ExamineWarning1 =ˆ /* P1 is examining an alarm */ ConﬁrmWarning1 =ˆ /* P1 conﬁrms an alarm */
ANY wx WHERE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ We1 ANY wx WHERE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ wc
/* wx has not yet been examined */ THEN wc := wc ∪ {wx} END;
THEN
IF wx ∈ wp THEN /* The alarm is present */ AbsentWarning1 =ˆ /* P1 indicates that wx is absent */
Wp1,We1 := Wp1 ∪ {wx},We1 ∪ {wx} ANY wx WHERE wx ∈ Ww
ELSE We1 := We1 ∪ {wx} END THEN wc := wc− {wx} END;
END;
BeginCycle1 =ˆ /* New cycle for P1 */ BeginCycle2 =ˆ /* New cycle for P2 */
SELECT We1 = Ww SELECT We2 = Ww
THEN We1,Wp1, Num1 := ∅, ∅, Num1 + 1 THEN We2,Wc2, Num2 := ∅, ∅, Num2 + 1
/* All the alarms will be examined */ /* All the alarms will be examined */
END; END;
ExamineWarning2 =ˆ /* P2 is examining an alarm */
ANY wx WHERE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ We2 /* wx has not yet been examined : wx /∈ We2 */
THEN IF wx ∈ wc
THEN Wc2,We2 := Wc2 ∪ {wx},We2 ∪ {wx} /* The alarm is conﬁrmed */
ELSE We2 := We2 ∪ {wx} END /* The alarm is not conﬁrmed */
END;
Note that interactions between P1 and P2 are achieved via the variable wc
which is modiﬁed by P1 and is accessed by P2.
Note also that the events BeginCycle1 and BeginCycle2 remove at once all
the elements of respectively we1, wp1 and we2, wc2: they model the beginning
of each cycle. As indicated in the guards (we1 = Ww and we2 = Ww), these
events can be activated only when all alarms have been examined by each
process.
4 From event models to modules: Introduction
The event system FWS2 models the interactions of the system with the envi-
ronment and between the two processes P1 and P2.
We will now illustrate, along with this example, the end of the process: go-
ing from this event system to the speciﬁcation of each component and to the
speciﬁcation of the interface module.
In order to do so, we have ﬁrst to transform the event system into a module
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which will be shared by the components. Its role is to provide each component
with the operations it needs in order to interact with the environment: this is
the interface module.
The speciﬁcation of each component is not directly derived from the event
model. It must be elaborated separately and it must contain the properties
characterizing the component on its own. Don’t forget that these properties
have not been taken into account in the event model. Here component spec-
iﬁcations can use some variables of the interface module. By doing so, we
can relate local properties of the component to the expected behaviour of the
whole system. This speciﬁcation can later be reﬁned in order to obtain its
implementation.
We will now illustrate this part of the process step by step.
Modules and operations. A module speciﬁcation MS = (x, IM,A,Oi) is
formed by a shared variable x that represents the module state, an invariant
IM that expresses static properties of the module, the speciﬁcation A that
initializes the module and the set of operations Oi for i ∈ 1..n that deﬁnes
the dynamics. Each operation Oi takes the form of a pre-post speciﬁcation
(Pi(x), Qi(x, x
′)). In the syntax of the tool, it takes the form Pre P (x) THEN
S where S is a generalized substitution. As there is a translation of gener-
alized substitution into before-after predicates [Abr 96-1], it corresponds to
the usual pre-post formulation for program speciﬁcation. Such modules are
transition systems, whose initial states are deﬁned by the initialization, and
whose transitions are deﬁned by the operations. From this semantic point of
view, modules and event systems are equivalent.
Consistency of a module. A module is said to be consistent if the invariant
is established by the initialization and preserved by each operation.
Reﬁnements. A moduleM is reﬁned byM1 if each operation ofM is reﬁned
by the corresponding operation of M1 and if the initialization of M is reﬁned
by the initialization of M1. An operation, this is, a program speciﬁcation
(P,Q), is reﬁned by another one (R,S) if for all program t, {R} t {S} implies
{P} t {Q}. These proof obligations are generated by the tools. There is a
semantic diﬀerence between an operation and an event: reﬁning a program
speciﬁcation allows to weak the pre-condition whereas reﬁning an event allows
to strength the guard.
Module implementations. Let M be a module (x, IM,A,Oi) . An imple-
mentation of M is a set of programs t0, t1, ..., tn such that:
{true} t0{A ∧ IM}, and {IM ∧ Pi} ti {IM ∧Qi}.
Those conditions plus the consistency of M , implies the following property:
For all M we have {true} t0;M(t1, . . . , tn){IM} where M is a combination
with if then else, while, sequence (;) and operations Oi. In other words, the
invariant is satisﬁed by all module states.
Module importation. We can import a module to implement another one
[Abr 96-1].
Let M be the same module as before and M1 be (x, IM1, A1, Vi) (for i ∈
96
Lopez, Simonot, Viguie
1..k). Each Vi is of the form (Ri, Si). To implementM1 through an importation
of M , we have:
(i) to provide for each Vi an expression Mi(O1, ..., On) built with combina-
tions of calls of Oi,
(ii) to prove that ViMi(O1, ..., On).
If the imported module M has an implementation i.e. a set of programs
t0, t1, ..., tn such that: {true} t0{A ∧ IM}, and {IM ∧ Pi} ti {IM ∧ Qi}, the
conditions above ensure that, for all M:
{true} t0;M(M1(t1, . . . , tn), . . . ,Mk(t1, . . . , tn)){IM1}.
5 Towards an interface module: ﬁrst step
5.1 Transformation of an event into an operation
An event system speciﬁcation allows us to observe a complete system - a
system which does not interact with the observer. So, a system speciﬁcation
models a closed universe. A program taking inputs and producing outputs is
not a closed universe. The way to connect these two approaches is to consider
the event system as a tool to observe the program behaviour. This is the case
if each transition allowed by an operation is also a possible transition of the
event which corresponds to this operation [Lop,Sim,Don 00], [Lop 02].
Then, to transform a system into a module, it suﬃces to transform each event:
E = any a where G(x, a) then Sx,a into the operation
[res←−]op(a) = pre G(x, a) then Sx,a.
We can freely add output parameters. It is obvious that in this case, the
event system and its corresponding module deﬁne the same transition system.
More complex translations can be done between events and operations. In
these cases, some proof obligations have to be generated and discharged. For
more details, see [Lop 02], chapter 5.7.
5.2 Application to FWS
The module interface is obtained from FWS2 following the translation deﬁned
above.
MACHINE FWS ENV
VARIABLES wp, se, wc,Num1,Wp1,We1, Wc2,We2, Num2
INVARIANT wp,wc,Wp1,We1,Wc2,We2 ⊆ Ww ∧ se ⊆ Ss ∧ Num1, Num2 ∈ NAT
INITIALIZATION wp, se, wc, Num1, Wp1, We1 Wc2, We2,Num2 :
(wp = ∅ ∧ se = ∅ ∧ wc = ∅ ∧Num1 = 0 ∧Wp1 = ∅ ∧We1 = ∅ ∧
Wc2 = ∅ ∧We2 = Ww ∧Num2 = 0)
OPERATIONS
NewWarning(wx) =ˆ EndWarning(wx) =ˆ
PRE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ wp PRE wx ∈ wp
THEN wp := wp ∪ {wx} END; THEN wp := wp− {wx} END;
EmittedSignal(sx) =ˆ ConﬁrmWarning1(wx) =ˆ
PRE sx ∈ Ss ∧ sx /∈ se PRE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ wc
THEN se := se ∪ {sx} END; THEN wc := wc ∪ {wx} END;
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EndSignal(sx) =ˆ AbsentWarning1(wx) =ˆ
PRE sx ∈ Se PRE wx ∈ Ww
THEN se := se− {sx} END; THEN wc := wc− {wx} END;
bres←− ExamineWarning2(wx) =ˆ bres←− ExamineWarning1(wx) =ˆ
PRE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ We2 PRE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ We1
THEN THEN
IF wx ∈ wc IF wx ∈ wp
THEN Wc2,We2, bres := THEN Wp1,We1, bres :=
Wc2 ∪ {wx},We2 ∪ {wx}, TRUE Wp1 ∪ {wx},We1 ∪ {wx}, TRUE
ELSE We2, bres := ELSE We1, bres :=
We2 ∪ {wx}, FALSE END We1 ∪ {wx}, FALSE END
END; END;
BeginCycle2 =ˆ BeginCycle1 =ˆ
PRE PRE
We2 = Ww We1 = Ww
THEN We2,Wc2, Num2 := THEN We1,Wp1, Num1 :=
∅, ∅, Num2 + 1 END ∅, ∅, Num1 + 1 END;
6 Toward an interface module: second step
6.1 Logical and abstract variables
All module variables are used to express properties. Some of them model
objects which will be eﬀectively implemented by the program -they are named
abstract variables, and have an operational content. Others are only logical
-they are called logical or auxiliary variables [Aba,Lam 88]. Abstract variables
are the only ones transformed during the module reﬁnement process. They
are implemented as well as data-reﬁned. Logical variables will not appear in
the ﬁnal implementation.
Let M be a module which contains abstract variables (a) and logical vari-
ables (l). Let M1 be the module obtained from M when all the expressions
where logical variables appear, are eliminated. We want to take, as an imple-
mentation ofM , any implementation ofM1. This is possible if each operation
OM of M is of the following form:
OM = (p(a) ∧ pl(a, l) , q(a, a′) ∧ ql(a, l, l′))
and satisﬁes :
∀a, a′, l. (p(a) ∧ pl(a, l) ∧ q(a, a′) → ∃l′. ql(a, l, l′)).
Consider now the corresponding operation in M1. It takes the form: opM1 =
(p(a) , q(a, a′)).
So we have:
(i) as soon as OM can be activated, OM1 can also be activated (the pre-
condition has been constrained).
(ii) abstract variables a, a′ do not depend on logical variables (but l may
depend on a).
(iii) under the pre-condition of OM , all the states which can be reached by
OM1 are also attainable by OM . This means that, during the reﬁnement
process, whatever implementation choice is made which reduces the in-
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ternal non-determinism of OM1 , it will realize the post-condition of OM .
These constraints ensure that any implementation of M1 is also an implemen-
tation of M [Lop 02].
From this, we can roughly consider M as an overloading of M1.
Logical variables allow to express logical properties, which involve notions
not directly present in M . These variables also allow to constrain the use of
operations of M1.
6.2 Application to FWS
In the interface module FWS ENV, abstract variables are those used to commu-
nicate with the environment. Other variables are logical:
VARIABLES wp, se, wc
LOGICAL VARIABLES Num1, Wp1, We1, Wc2, We2, Num2
The base module corresponding to FWS ENV i.e. FWS ENV without logical
variables is:
MACHINE FWS BASE
VARIABLES wp, se, wc
INITIALIZATION wp, se, wc: wp = ∅ ∧ se = ∅ ∧ wc = ∅
OPERATIONS
NewWarning(wx) =ˆ EndWarning(wx) =ˆ
PRE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ wp PRE wx ∈ wp
THEN wp := wp ∪ {wx} END; THEN wp := wp− {wx} END;
EmittedSignal(sx) =ˆ ConﬁrmWarning1(wx) =ˆ
PRE sx ∈ Ss ∧ sx /∈ se PRE wx ∈ Ww ∧ wx /∈ wc
THEN se := se ∪ {sx} END; THEN wc := wc ∪ {wx} END;
EndSignal(sx) =ˆ AbsentWarning1(wx) =ˆ
PRE sx ∈ Se PRE wx ∈ Ww
THEN se := se− {sx} END; THEN wc := wc− {wx} END;
bres←− ExamineWarning2(wx) =ˆ bres←− ExamineWarning1(wx) =ˆ
PRE wx ∈ Ww PRE wx ∈ Ww
THEN THEN
IF wx ∈ wc IF wx ∈ wp
THEN bres := TRUE THEN bres := TRUE
ELSE bres := FALSE END ELSE bres := FALSE END
END; END;
This interface module is the eﬀective interface module. NewWarning and
EndWarning are implemented by the devices which detect warning situations
(sensors and other electronic devices); EmittedSignal and EndSignal are im-
plemented by output devices; ExamineWarning1 is implemented by a mecha-
nism provided by the environment to obtain inputs and so on...
Note that BeginCycle1 and BeginCycle2 have disappeared. They are, in
fact, logical operations which formally express the necessity of examining all
the alarms. They have a logical control role.
99
Lopez, Simonot, Viguie
7 Component speciﬁcation
7.1 Sharing
At this point, we have an interface module which provides the communication
operations of the system. We have now to write the component speciﬁcations.
In this application, we want:
1- to have the interface module E=(x, IE,A, Vi).
2- to model each component in a separate and independent module: M1 =
(x, y, IM1, A1,Wi) and M2 = (x, z, IM2, A2, Si). By independent, we mean
that the consistency is proved independently for each module. It also means
that each module has to be reﬁned independently.
3- to force each module to be implemented using an import of the same inter-
face module E. E becomes a shared module.
4- to preserve the correctness. By correctness, we mean that every interleaving
of calls of programs realizing M1 and M2 operations (which modify interface
variables through operation calls of E) establishes both the invariants of M1
and M2.
Formally: for every program tVj which realizes Vj and for every combination
N1 of tVj and N2 of tVj we must have:
{true} IE;A1;A2; (N1||N2) {IM1 ∧ IM2}.
As E needs to be shared by M1 and M2, the correctness cannot be expressed
locally on each component module.
This is clearly not true in general: as M1 and M2 can share variables of E,
an operation of M2 can break the invariant of M1 and vice-versa.
To avoid this problem, one solution is the following:
• For each componentMj we must identify the set of operations Oj of E which
are exclusively used byMj. Oj is the set of operations thatMj will be allowed
to use.
• Let Rj be the set of variables modiﬁed by Oj, Rj ⊆ x. Rj is the set of
variables that can be used by Mj.
7.2 Application to FWS
We are able now to model the two processes P1 and P2. We focus on P2,
the model of P1 can be made in the same way. First we have to extract
the FWS ENV operations which will only be used by the process P2. They are
EmittedSignal, EndSignal, ExamineWarning2, BeginCycle2. So the vari-
ables of P2 coming from FWS ENV are se,Wc2,We2,Num2. It will also include
its proper variables in order to express its own local properties. The proper
variables are: wa, wni, wnis, sa, snc, they have been introduced to formalize
the following local properties:
1. Conﬁrmed warnings not inhibited by the current ﬂy phase are activated
warnings. Wc2 ∩ wni ⊆ wa.
2. No cancelled signals, associated with activated warnings, are activated sig-
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nals.
3. Activated warnings are conﬁrmed warnings.
4. Activated signals are associated to activated warnings.
5. Emitted signals are activated signals.
6. The crew is always able to determine the warnings associated to emitted
signals.
Another property is, that during each cycle, all the alarms must be exam-
ined. This is expressed by We2 = Ww. We use here logical variables. As
the process P2 is cyclic, the module includes only one operation Cycle2 with
a true pre-condition and which models a step of the cycle. All the properties
of the module are expressed into the invariant - the post-condition of Cycle2
just establishes the invariant and counts the number of steps.
MACHINE P2 Processus 2.
SETS Ww, Ss
CONSTANTS s w, c w
PROPERTIES s w ∈ Ss→ Ww ∧ c w ∈ Cc↔ Ww
VARIABLES se, Wc2, We2, Num2, wa, wni, wnis, sa, snc
INVARIANT
se ⊆ Ss ∧Wc2 ⊆ Ww ∧We2 ⊆ Ww ∧ Num2 ∈ NAT ∧ wa ⊆ Wc2 ∧
wni ⊆ Ww ∧ wnis ⊆ wa ∧ sa ⊆ Ss ∧ se ⊆ sa ∧ snc ⊆ Ss ∧
Wc2 ∩ wni ⊆ wa ∧ (Property 1.)
s w−1[wa] ∩ snc ⊆ sa ∧ (Property 2.)
wa ⊆ Wc2 ∧ (Property 3.)
s w[sa] ⊆ wa ∧ (Property 4.)
se ⊆ sa ∧ (Property 5.)
wnis ⊆ ran(c w) ∧ (Property 6.)
We2 = Ww communication property
INITIALIZATION
se, Wc2, We2, Cc2, Ce2, Pc2, Pe2, Num2
wa, wni, wnis, sa, snc: INV ARIANT
OPERATIONS
Cycle2 =ˆ
se, Wc2, We2, Num2, wa, wni, wnis, sa, snc:
(INV ARIANT ∧Num2 = Num2 0 + 1)
END
Note that the variable Num2, which is incremented by each cycle, forces
each implementation of Cycle2 to behave correctly: if this increment does not
occur, a reﬁnement of Cycle2 by skip would still be correct.
When Num2 is incremented, the following happens:
Num2 is a variable “coming” from FWS ENV, hence each implementation of
Cycle2 will call BeginCycle2 as it is the only operation of FWS ENV which
modiﬁes Num2. Each implementation must reestablish the invariant, as it is
the post-condition of Cycle2. And, in particular, it must establish We2 =
Ww. This can only be done by as many calls to ExamineWarning2, as the
number of alarms in Ww.
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8 Conclusion
A ﬁrst result of this work is to propose a method which takes into account
the entire development of a system. This method has been used to model two
industrial case studies. We have used the existing tools (in our case Atelier
B) to formally prove a large part of the proof obligations generated by the
method and which is actually supported by these tools. Almost all the gen-
erated proof obligations have been automatically discharged (around 85 %).
The new notions : logical variables, shared modules and event-to-operation
transformations, generate new proof obligations. They are not supported by
the actual tools ; these proof obligations have been proved “by hand”. The
fact that it has been used on industrial cases, shows that the proposed method
is suitable to treat large-scale systems. Secondly, what is interesting is that
these new notions solve the problems met in previous works, when we tried
to model applications of this kind with only the notion of module [Lop 96-1].
Another point of interest is that these extensions do not represent a profound
modiﬁcation to the existing theory. Hence, their incorporation into existing
tools can be achieved.
Further work has to be done to improve ( to reﬁne) the conditions we have
formulated in order to ensure the correctness of the whole process.
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